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I. 
ARGUMENT 
THIS IS NOT A WORKERS' COMPENSATION CASE 
INVOLVING A NO-FAULT, ADMINISTRATIVE CLAIM FOR 
BENEFITS. 
As the defendant acknowledged 1n her brief, workers' 
compensation cases and negligence cases are fundamentally different. 
They have different purposes, are brought through different avenues, 
seek different remedies, and have different analyses to determine 
compensation. 
A. Workers' Compensation Cases 
As the Court is well aware, workers compensation cases are no-
fault, administrative claims brought before an administrative law judge 
to determine eligibility for workers' compensation benefits. These 
claims are brought through the injured party's employer when the party 
was injured in the course and scope of employment at the time of the 
injury. See UTAH CODE ANN. §34A-2-401. As the Utah Supreme Court 
has clearly stated, the Workers' Compensation Act "should be liberally 
construed and applied to provide coverage. Any doubt respecting the 
right of compensation will be resolved in favor of the injured employee." 
State Tax Comm'n v. Indus. Comm'n of Utah, 685 P.2d 1051, 1053 
(Utah 1984). The evident policy behind the Act's liberal access to 
benefits is to protect Utah workers. 
For example, say employee "A" is at the office after hours drafting 
an appellate reply brief when one of "A's" co-workers, "B", comes into 
the office to watch a basketball game because his cable is out at his 
home. Both employees draw paychecks from the same employer, but 
"B" has no other purpose at the office that night other than to watch the 
basketball game. As "A" is walking from the mail room to his office, "B" 
comes running down the hall in celebration of his team's game-winning 
buzzer-beater and knocks "A" to the ground, injuring him. 
In this example, a workers' compensation case would be when "A" 
makes his no-fault, administrative claim for benefits under his 
employer's workers' compensation policy. As stated above, the claim 
will center upon "A's" status and whether or not he was in the course 
and scope of employment at the time of his injury. 
B. Negligence Cases 
In stark contrast to the no-fault, administrative claims for 
workers' compensation benefits in a workers' compensation case, a 
third-party negligence claim is an adversarial claim that an individual 
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brings against another party for a negligent act that causes injury to 
the claimant. 
Using the facts in the example above, if employee "A" was to bring 
an adversarial claim against employee "B" for injuries resulting from 
"B's" negligent acts outside the course and scope of "B's" employment, 
that would be a third-party negligence claim. In contrast to the 
workers' compensation analysis to determine eligibility for benefits 
that focuses on the injured party's status, the analysis in a third-party 
action against "B" centers upon the status of "B", the defendant, and 
whether or not he was acting within the course and scope of 
employment at the time of the injury. See Utah Home Fire Ins. Co. v. 
Manning, 1999 UT 77, 985 P.2d 243 (looking to the defendant's 
employment status to determine course and scope of employment). 
Stated differently, the test for liability in the workers' 
compensation arena does not deal with the relation of an individual's 
fault or negligence to an event; instead, the test centers upon the 
relationship of an event to the employment. The leading treatise on 
workers' compensation law contrasts workers' compensation cases from 
negligence cases, stating that, "[t]ort litigation is an adversary contest 
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to right a wrong between the contestants; workers' compensation is a 
system, not a contest, to supply security to injured workers and 
distribute the cost to the consumers of the product." Arthur Larson & 
Lex K. Larson, Larson's Workers' Compensation Law§ 1.03 (2015). 
C. This is a Third-Party Negligence Case. 
The case before the Court is an adversary contest to right a wrong 
between contestants. See Appellant's Brief at§ I. The plaintiff does not 
seek workers' compensation benefits; she seeks recourse from a third-
party who was acting outside the course and scope of employment. The 
purpose of this action and appeal is not to determine access to workers' 
compensation benefits; it is to seek recourse for a wrong committed 
between individuals. 
II. TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE PLAINTIFF'S THIRD-
PARTY NEGLIGENCE CLAIM IS PROPER, WE MUST 
DETERMINE IF THE DEFENDANT WAS AN EMPLOYEE 
IN THE COURSE AND SCOPE. 
To determine whether a third-party negligence claim is barred by 
the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers' Compensation Act, 
Utah law dictates that we look to whether the defendant was in the 
course and scope of employment. See Manning, 1999 UT 77, 985 P.2d 
243; Colvin v. Giguere, 2014 UT 23, 330 P.3d 83, 87. Larson's Workers' 
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Compensation Law agrees with this analysis, plainly stating that "[i]t 
must be observed that the immunity attaches to the coemployee only 
when the coemployee is acting in the course of employment." Arthur 
Larson & Lex K. Larson, Larson's Workers' Compensation Law § 
111.03[3] (2015)(citing cases from 30 states)(emphasis added). 
The purpose of this appeal is to determine the propriety of the 
plaintiffs third-party claim against the defendant. To make such a 
determination, we must answer the question, "Is the defendant a third-
party against whom the plaintiff can properly maintain a negligence 
claim?" To answer that question, we must first ask, "Was the defendant 
an employee in the course and scope at the time of the injury?" If the 
answer is "yes", the workers' compensation exclusive remedy provision 
applies and the defendant is protected from suit. If the answer is "no", 
the plaintiff may properly bring a negligence action against the 
defendant and the exclusive remedy provision does not apply. 
It is only after analyzing the course and scope of the defendant 
that we can determine whether the Workers' Compensation Act would 
apply to this case. 
5 
A. Course and Scope Questions Must be Left to a Jury. 
Utah courts have made it abundantly clear that questions of 
course and scope of employment are inherently questions of fact that 
must be left to a jury. Ahlstrom v. Salt Lake City Corp., 2003 UT 4, 73 
P.3d 315, 317. The Supreme Court asserted that "[t]he scope of 
employment issue must be submitted to a jury 'whenever reasonable 
minds may differ as to whether the [employee] was at a certain time 
involved wholly or partly in the performance of his [employer's] 
business or within the scope of employment." Clover v. Snowbird, 808 
P.2d 1037, 1040 (Utah 1991)(quoting Carter v. Bessey, 97 Utah 427, 93 
P.2d 490, 493 (1939)). 
III. THE DEFENDANT URGES THE COURT TO MISAPPLY A 
TEST USED TO DETERMINE ELIGIBILITY FOR 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BENEFITS. 
As stated above, the Workers' Compensation Act and its 
corresponding tests are directed at providing liberal access to benefits 
for injured workers. However, the plaintiff in this case does not seek 
workers' compensation benefits through her employer. She seeks 
recourse from the defendant for the defendant's negligent act outside 
the course and scope of the defendant's employment. Yet, Defendant 
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asks the Court to misapply a test that was designed to answer the 
question: "Is the injured party entitled to workers' compensation 
benefits?", as the Hope court erroneously did 28 years ago. 1 
Both the plaintiff and the defendant have cited the Supreme 
Court's promptings to keep the rules governing scope of employment in 
workers' compensation cases and negligence cases separate from one 
another: 
With very different presumptions governing workers' 
compensation and negligence cases, it would not be wise to 
hold that rules governing scope of employment questions in 
one area are wholly applicable to the other because the legal 
effect of identical facts may be different in a negligence case 
than in a workers' compensation case. 
Ahlstrom, 73 P .3d at fn.1. Even though the workers' compensation 
rules to determine scope of employment were created for the specific 
purpose of determining eligibility for workers' compensation benefits, 
the defendant now asks this court to stick a square peg in a round hole 
by applying a benefit eligibility test to determine course and scope in 
the negligence context. 
1 See Brief of Appellant at§ I (discussing the Hope court's 
misapplication of the workers' compensation "premises rule" into a 
third-party negligence claim even though it had never been adopted as 
Utah law and had never been applied to a negligence claim). 
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A. Applying the Premises Rule to Negligence Cases will 
Create Employer Liability for Employee Actions that 
Fall Outside the Course and Scope of Employment. 
The defendant cites the "bright-line" premises rule discussed in 
Soldier Creek as establishing blanket application in all contexts-
workers' compensation cases and negligence cases. Soldier Creek v. 
Bailey, 709 P.2d 1165 (Utah 1985). However, the cases the defendant 
cites from the "overwhelming majority of states" adopting the rule fall 
squarely within the context of determining eligibility for workers' 
compensation benefits-the context where the premises rule was 
created and where it belongs. See Brief of Appellee at 11. 
If the Court were to accept the defendant's invitation to adopt 
universal application of the workers' compensation premises rule-once 
again, a test created to determine eligibility for workers' compensation 
benefits under a no-fault administrative system-in negligence cases 
without any question as to course and scope, it would make employers 
liable for injuries caused outside the course and scope of employment. 
Using the example discussed above between employees "A" and 
"B", even though "B" was not operating within the course and scope of 
employment when he went running down the hall in celebration on his 
8 
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team's victory, blanket application of the premises rule would make the 
employer liable for any injuries sustained by "A", who was in the course 
and scope of employment, and any injuries sustained by "B", who was 
not in the course and scope of employment. 
Taking this automatic application of the premises rule a little 
further, suppose employee "B" had just entered his employer's parking 
lot before his shift on a snowy morning when he decides to do a few 
donuts in his car. When "B" crashes into "A", who is also on his way to 
work for the same employer, the employer will be held liable for both 
parties' injuries, without even asking a single question about course and 
scope. 
Finally, assume "B" is shooting clay pigeons 1n his employer's 
parking lot on his day off when he trips and accidentally shoots "A" who 
is walking out to his car after his shift. The defendant in this case 
would likely argue, as she did in her brief, that "an employee who is 
injured by a co-employee on their employer's premises may not file a 
third-party negligence claim against her co-employee". See Brief of 
Appellee at 5. If Utah courts are to apply the "bright line" premises rule 
to all cases, as the defendant argues they should-by simply asking if a 
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person who draws paychecks from an employer is on that employer's 
premises-"B" will immediately be determined to be in the course and 
scope of employment. As a result, the employer would be liable for the 
injuries of both parties, and "B" would be immune from suit under the 
workers' compensation exclusivity provision. 
It is difficult to imagine that such unfettered application of the 
premises rule would be in line with the intended purpose of the 
exclusive remedy provision of the Workers' Compensation Act. 
B. Applying the Premises Rule to Negligence Cases will 
Eliminate Employers' Right of Subrogation for Injuries 
Caused Outside the Employer's Control. 
Absent a compelling policy reason to the contrary, creators of risk 
are legally responsible for the risks they create. B.R. ex rel. Jeffs v. 
West, 2012 UT 11, il 21, 275 P.3d 228, 234. Litigants in the state of 
Utah are only responsible for their share, or proportion, of fault. UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 78B-5-818(2). This statute is the reflection of clearly 
stated public policy set by the legislature. 
The facts presented by this case do not invoke the policy 
considerations behind the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers' 
Compensation Act. If the employer fails to provide the required 
10 
benefits to an injured employee, the liability for those injuries is 
restored with key defenses waived as a matter of law. Employers pay 
for limited liability by agreeing to cover injuries on the job regardless of 
fault. This is a bargained and paid for limitation of liability. There is 
no compelling policy reason to extend limited liability to a tortfeasor 
who has not paid for such a limitation, and who confers no benefit to the 
employer while creating risks of harm to others. 
In this case, the defendant seeks immunity from all claims arising 
from the plaintiffs injury, whether legal or equitable, when she was not 
subject to the control of her employer, nor furthering her employer's 
business at the time of the plaintiffs injury. 
Anytime an employee on the clock for an employer sustains injury, 
the employer likewise suffers a loss, as the employer has a 
responsibility-whether directly or through insurance-to compensate 
the injured employee. Regardless of fault, the employer is compelled by 
the Worker's Compensation Act to unconditionally provide benefits to 
the injured-on-the-job employee. If the injured employee is successful 
in obtaining a recovery against the liable third party, the employer, or 
the employer's worker's compensation carrier, has a high-priority 
11 
statutory right of subrogation. This right of subrogation exists in order 
to appropriately, justly and fairly allocate the risk back to its 
creator. As insurance premiums are set based on the scope and extent 
of risks covered, insurance companies must be allowed to reallocate 
risks not created by their insured. 
If the trial court's ruling is allowed to stand, the employer and its 
insurance carrier are stuck holding the bill to cover liabilities it did not 
create. In such a circumstance, an innocent employer is powerless to 
mitigate or avoid the loss because the tortfeasor was not subject to its 
control when the accident occurred, yet the employer is stuck holding 
the bill all the same. If a recovery is denied to the employee, likewise a 
recovery will also be denied to an otherwise innocent employer. 
C. The Analysis for Course and Scope to Determine an 
Employer's Liability is the same for Claims between 
Coemployees and Claims of Respondeat Superior. 
The defendant has taken issue with the fact that the cases 
Plaintiff cites, which address course and scope in the negligence setting, 
come in the context of respondeat superior. The defendant argues that 
the opinions do not apply because the plaintiffs in those cases have no 
potential workers' compensation claims. However, to determine 
12 
application of the exclusive remedy prov1s1on, whether between 
coemployees or in the context of respondeat superior, the analysis is the 
same. If the negligent party is determined to be an employee in the 
course and scope, the negligent party's employer is liable in both 
contexts. If the employer is found liable for an injury between 
coemployees, the plaintiff is restricted to the exclusive remedy under 
the Workers' Compensation Act. If the employer of the negligent party 
is found liable in the respondeat superior context, the plaintiff may 
recover from the negligent party's employer in the form of money 
damages. 
Although the source of compensation varies depending on whether 
or not the parties are co-workers, the analysis by which we determine 
an employer's liability, through course and scope of employment, is the 
same. 
IV. BY CALLING THIS A WORKERS' COMPENSATION CASE 
AND APPL YING A WORKERS' COMPENSATION TEST, 
DEFENDANT SKIPS THE COURSE AND SCOPE 
ANALYSIS AND ASSUMES DEFENDANT'S STATUS. 
As this case is a suit for negligence between the plaintiff and 
defendant, Plaintiff has urged this court to apply the Birkner test that 
was established in the negligence arena for the purpose of determining 
13 
course and scope of employment in the context of a negligence claim. 
Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 771 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1989). 
The defendant, on the other hand, asks the Court to apply a 
workers' compensation test designed to determine eligibility for 
benefits, as explained above. Yet despite the defendant's insistence 
that the Court analyze this case under the Workers' Compensation Act, 
the defendant, herself, does not even ask the necessary course and scope 
questions under the Act. 
If we were to analyze course and scope of employment under the 
Workers' Compensation Act as the defendant argues we should, we 
would still have to look to the statutory definition of "employee" under 
the Act, which defines "employee" as "a person in the service of any 
employer ... under any contract of hire." UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-2-
104(1)(b)(emphasis added). Thus, even analyzing course and scope 
under the Workers' Compensation Act, we would still have to analyze 
whether or not the defendant was in the service of her employer at the 
time of the accident. 
Rather than conduct any such course and scope analysis under the 
Act, and rather than analyzing the facts under the test already provided 
14 
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by the Supreme Court for negligence course and scope questions in 
Birkner, the defendant simply assumed her own employment status 
based on the fact that the plaintiff and defendant both drew paychecks 
from the IRS and ended the course and scope analysis there. 
As stated above, "immunity attaches to the coemployee only when 
the coemployee is acting in the course of employment." Arthur Larson & 
Lex K. Larson, Larson's Workers' Compensation Law§ 111.03[3] (2015). 
By assuming the defendant's employment status and not asking the 
necessary course and scope questions, Defendant has arbitrarily placed 
this case in the workers' compensation box and conducted her entire 
analysis and entrenched her entire argument within that box. 
Never did the defendant conduct any analysis as to service to the 
employer, control of the employer over the defendant, control of the 
employer over the parking lot, benefit to the employer, hours of 
employment, spatial boundaries of employment, or whether Defendant 
was on the premises for another purpose. 
The central problem with the defendant's argument is that it begs 
the question by using its assumed conclusion-that the defendant was 
an employee-as its premise. The defendant's line of reasoning cycles as 
15 
follows: Because the defendant 1s an employee, this is a workers' 
compensation case . Because this 1s a workers' compensation case, we 
must use a workers' compensation test to determine course and scope of 
employment (the pre1nises rule). Under the workers' compensation test 
to determine course and scope of employment (the premises rule), the 
defendant was an employee. 
Defendant was an employee. 
Under the workers' compensation 
test for course and scope (the 
premises rule), Defendant was an 
employee. 
Because Defendant was an 
employee, this is a workers' 
compensation case. 
Because this is a workers' 
compensation case we must apply 
the workers' compensation test for 
course and scope (the premises 
rule). 
Figure 1 - Defendant's Circular Argument 
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It is within this circle of logic that the defendant bases her entire 
argument, not once looking to the gatekeeper question to determine if 
the Workers' Compensation Act even applies: "Was the defendant an 
employee in the course and scope of employment at the time of the 
accident?" 
V. SUBSEQUENT SUPREME COURT DECISIONS HA VE 
ERODED THE HOPE DECISION'S FOUNDATION. 
The Hope court explained its reasoning when it held that the 
plaintiff in Hope was only entitled to workers' compensation benefits: 
We decline to follow those jurisdictions which allow plaintiff 
recovery from both workers' compensation and from a fellow 
employee who might have caused the plaintiffs injury. Such 
a result necessitates finding that plaintiff was in the course of 
her employment for the purposes of workers' compensation 
and that defendant was in some other status. 
Hope v. Berrett, 756 P.2d 102, 103 fn. 2 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)(emphasis added). 
Based on the principle that a plaintiff and a defendant could not have 
different employment statuses, the Hope court refused to allow the 
defendant to have any status that was different from the Plaintiffs. 
Not only does this reasoning depart from the analytical method 
employed by the Supreme Court to determine course and scope, but it is 
in direct conflict with subsequent Supreme Court decisions. 
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A. The Hope Court's Reasoning Departs from the Supreme 
Court's Analytical Method for Determining Course and 
Scope. 
Based on the reasoning quoted above, it is clear that the Hope 
court's decision focused on the employment status of the Plaintiff to 
determine course and scope and the applicability of the workers' 
compensation exclusivity provision. This flies directly in the face of the 
Supreme Court's method of analysis for determining course and scope of 
employment in such actions between potential co-workers. 
As outlined in Section II, above, the Utah Supreme Court looks to 
the defendant's status at the time of the injury to determine whether a 
third-party negligence claim is barred by the exclusive remedy 
provision of the Workers' Compensation Act. See Manning, 1999 UT 
77, 985 P.2d 243; Colvin, 2014 UT 23, 330 P.3d 83. In interpreting the 
Manning decision, Defendant correctly noted in her brief that "[t]he 
propriety of a negligence action against [the defendant] centered on 
whether he was considered an 'employee' under the Act." See Brief of 
Appellee at 17; see also Manning, 1999 UT 77, 985 P.2d 243. This falls 
directly in line with Professor Larson's point quoted above that 
"immunity attaches to the coemployee only when the coemployee is 
18 
acting in the course of employment." Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson, 
Larson's Workers' Compensation Law § 111.03[3] (2015)(emphasis 
added). 
However, the defendant makes the argument that if the plaintiff 
collected workers' compensation benefits, it would somehow establish 
the defendant's status as an "employee" for purposes of Plaintiffs third-
party negligence claim without even looking to the defendant at all. See 
Brief of Appellee at 14-16. 
If this were the correct analytical method, the Supreme Court 
would have ended its analysis in Manning in the fourth paragraph of 
the opinion where the court states that "Manning received workers' 
compensation benefits". 1999 UT 77, ~ 4, 985 P.2d 243, 245. At that 
point, Defendant's proposed course and scope analysis would be 
complete. But the Manning court did not end its analysis there. The 
court went on to analyze whether or not the defendant was in the 
course and scope of employment to determine whether the exclusive 
remedy provision applied. Id. 
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B. The Hope Court's Reasoning Directly Conflicts with 
Subsequent Supreme Court Decisions. 
As quoted above, the Hope court's holding turned on its refusal to 
allow the plaintiff to be in the course of employment for purposes of 
workers' compensation and have the defendant be in some other status. 
756 P.2d at 103 fn. 2. Such a notion may have been inconceivable in 1988 
when Hope was decided, but that had clearly changed by 1999, when 
the Supreme Court decided Manning. 
As illustrated in the preceding subsection, the Supreme Court was 
well aware that the plaintiff had already been considered an employee 
for purposes of workers' compensation benefits when it acknowledged 
that "Manning received workers' compensation benefits". 1999 UT 77, 
,r 4, 985 P.2d at 245. The fact that the court did not immediately and 
arbitrarily give the same employment status to the defendant 1s 
evidence that the analysis does not stop with the plaintiffs status. It 
shows that it was very much a possibility that the plaintiff was in the 
course of employment for workers' compensation purposes and that the 
defendant was in some other status. Id. 
Taking it even further, in Ahlstrom, the Supreme Court found 
that the defendant was not in the course and scope of employment 
20 
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when the defendant, an off-duty police officer, negligently injured 
another party in a motor-vehicle accident. Ahlstrom v. Salt Lake City, 
2003 UT 4, 73 P.3d 315. Yet nearly four years later, the same court 
attributed the status of employee in the course and scope for purposes 
of obtaining workers' compensation benefits to the same defendant in 
the same accident. Salt Lake City Corp. v. Labor Comm 'n, 2007 UT 4, 153 
P.3d 179. More than just allowing a plaintiff and defendant to have 
different statuses within the same event, the Supreme Court allowed a 
single individual to have different statuses within the same event. 
Id. 
The court then explained that application of the going and coming 
rule to a single event may result in treating an individual as an 
employee for purposes of determining eligibility for benefits, while 
withholding employee status for purposes of a negligence claim. Id. at 
180-181. 
Thus, the Hope court's reluctance to allow different employment 
statuses to the plaintiff and the defendant for the same event has 
clearly been made obsolete by the Supreme Court's subsequent 
decisions. 
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CONCLUSION 
The very foundation upon which the Hope decision was 
established has eroded through subsequent Utah Supreme Court 
decisions. Because the trial court based its decision entirely upon Hope 
and misapplied a test designed to determine eligibility for workers' 
compensation benefits into this third-party negligence claim, Plaintiff 
asks the Court to remand this case to the district court with orders that 
a jury make the necessary findings of fact as to whether the defendant 
was acting within the course and scope of employment under the 
Birkner third-party negligence test. 
Dated ,his 8th day of July, 2016 
ford DeBry 
Zachary E. Lambert 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOC. 
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